Benedict Bichler v. DEI Systems Inc. : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2006
Benedict Bichler v. DEI Systems Inc. : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John Pearce; Adam B. Price; Jones, Waldo, Holbrook and McDonough P.C.; John C. Hansberry;
Pepper Hamilton LLP; Attorneys for Appellant.
Craig Carlile; Brent D. Wride; Gregory S. Roberts; Ray, Quinney and Nebeker P.C.; Attorneys for
Appellee.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Bichler v. DEI Systems, No. 20061162.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2662




DEI SYSTEMS, INC., 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No 200611<>. 
District Court Case No. 060904754 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
(Oral Argument Requested) 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE ANN BOYDEN 
Craig Carlile 
Brent D. Wride 
Gregory S. Roberts 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
86 North University Avenue, Suite 430 
Provo,Utah 84601-4420 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
John Pearce (USB #8585) 
Adam B. Price (USB #7769) 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH, PC 
170 So. Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1644 
John C. Hansberry (Pro Hac Vice) 
PEPPER HAMILTON LLP 
500 Grant Street, 50th Floor 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219-2502 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JUL 1 6 2007 




DEI SYSTEMS, INC., 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20061162 
District Court Case No. 060904754 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
(Oral Argument Requested) 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE ANN BOYDEN 
Craig Carlile 
Brent D. Wride 
Gregory S. Roberts 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
86 North University Avenue, Suite 430 
Provo,Utah 84601-4420 
John Pearce (USB #8585) 
Adam B. Price (USB #7769) 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH, PC 
170 So. Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1644 
John C. Hansberry (Pro Hac Vice) 
PEPPER HAMILTON LLP 
500 Grant Street, 50th Floor 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219-2502 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Contents 
Table of Authorities 
I. Introduction 
II. Argument 
A. DEI's Claim of Setoff is a Proper Defense in the Unlawful 
Detainer Action Because it Arises Out of the Same 
Transaction and Business as Bichler's Claim 
B. DEI's Claim for Setoff Has the Required Mutuality of 
Obligation 
C. DEI' s Claim of Setoff Against its Rent Payment Obligations 
Are Not Precluded by the Lease Agreement, and in any Event, 
Properly Exist Apart from any Contractual Provision 
III. Conclusion 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Colonial Tri-City Ltd. Partnership v. Ben Franklin Stores, Inc., 
880 P.2d 648 (Ariz. App. 1993) 
First Security Bank of Utah v. Utah Turkey Growers, Inc., 610 P.2d 
329 (Utah 1980) 
Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168 (Cal. 1974) 
Lincoln Financial Corp. v. Ferrier, 567 P.2d 1102 (Utah 1977) 
Mark VIIFinancial Consultants Corp. v. Smedley, 792 P.2d 130 (Utah 
App. 1990) 
Motoda v. Donohoe, 459 P.2d 654 (Wash. App. 1969) 
In re Davidovich, 901 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1990) 
In re Nuclear Imaging Systems; Inc., 260 B.R. 724 (Bankr. 
E.D.Pa.2000) 
P.H. Investment v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018 (Utah 1991) 
Rules 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 13 
Other Authorities 
5 Collier on Bankruptcy (15th ed. rev. 1999) 
20 AM. JUR. 2D COUNTERCLAIM, RECOUPMENT AND SETOFF 
RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY 
I. Introduction 
By this appeal, DEI simply seeks an opportunity to assert setoff as an 
affirmative defense to alleged rent payments. DEI's setoff right is contractual (R. 
15 - R. 16,1f 25) and further exists as a matter of Utah law {see Mark VII Financial 
Consultants Corp. v. Smedley, 792 P.2d 130, 132-33 (Utah App. 1990)). Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 13 expressly permits DEI to raise this defense, which 
arises out of the same transaction and business between DEI and Bichler at issue in 
this case. 
Bichler attempts to block DEI's lawful defense by misstating DEI's 
position and ignoring the relevant case law and contractual provisions. First, 
Bichler ignores this Court's clear pronouncement of what constitutes a proper 
counterclaim or defense in an unlawful detainer action, advocating for a more 
restrictive "dependence of covenants" test that contradicts, and lacks any basis, in 
Utah jurisprudence. Second, Bichler apparently fails to understand the basis of 
DEI's claim of setoff, clearly set forth in the record below and the Appellant's 
Brief, arguing somehow that DEI's claim against Bichler lacks "mutuality of 
obligation." Last, Bichler asks this Court to ignore unequivocal case law that 
demonstrates that the right of setoff exists apart from, and even in the absence of, 
any contractual provision. 
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In short, Bichler has failed to offer any basis upon which this Court 
could deny DEI's appeal. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below and in the 
Appellant' Brief, the District Court erred when it found that DEI's claim of setoff 
was not a valid defense to Bichler's claims in the unlawful detainer action, and its 
Order should be reversed. 
II. Argument 
A. DEI's Claim of Setoff is a Proper Defense in the Unlawful Detainer 
Action Because it Arises Out of the Same Transaction and Business as 
Bichler's Claim 
Utah law permits DEI to raise any defense or counterclaim "arising 
out of the same transaction or business as the subject matter of the complaint." 
Bichler, however, misconstruing Utah law, and borrowing heavily from irrelevant 
out-of-state case law, argues that "[a] 'proper counterclaim' is one that satisfies the 
concept of dependence of covenants." Apellee's Brief, p. 6. This position 
contradicts Utah Supreme Court precedent, which permits a broader range of 
counterclaims and defenses. 
Bichler improperly attempts to limit the scope of valid defenses or 
counterclaims under Utah's unlawful detainer statute by seizing on this Court's 
reference to the "concept of dependence of covenants" in P.H. Investment v. 
Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah 1991). The "concept of dependence of 
covenants," however, is not the test for determining whether a defense or 
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counterclaim is proper in an unlawful detainer action under Utah law. To the 
contrary, this Court has consistently held, including in it its opinion in P.H. 
Investment, that a counterclaim or defense is "proper" in an unlawful detainer 
action if it "aris[es] out of the same transaction or business as the subject matter of 
the complaint." See, e.g., P.H. Investment, 818 P.2d at 1021; Lincoln Financial 
Corp. v. Ferrier, 567 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Utah 1977). 
Dependence of covenants is nothing more than the concept that a 
tenant need not pay rent when the landlord has breached an express or implied 
term of the lease because the tenant's covenant to pay rent is contingent on the 
landlord's covenants in the lease. See Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168, 
1180-181 (Cal. 1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 7.1. No Utah case, 
nor the California case cited in P.H. Investment, has held that a valid counterclaim 
or defense in an unlawful detainer action must satisfy the concept of dependence of 
covenants. P.H. Investment, the only Utah case to use the phrase "dependence of 
covenants" in the context of an unlawful detainer action, merely held that a 
tenant's claim, which in that case was premised on the concept of dependant 
covenants, was a permissive defense. See P.H. Investment, 818 P.2d at 1021 
(citing Green, 517 P.2d at 1180-181). 
The concept of dependant covenants is, at most, only one way to 
determine whether a claim or defense in an unlawful detainer action "arisfes] out 
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of the same transaction or business as the subject matter of the complaint." See 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-15. This Court should reject Bichler's baseless attempt 
to narrow the test for determining what constitutes a proper defense or 
counterclaim in an unlawful detainer action.1 
B. DEI's Claim for Setoff Has the Required Mutuality of Obligation 
Bichler next argues that DEI's claim of setoff fails because it does not 
satisfy the mutuality of obligation requirement for a valid setoff. Appellee's Brief, 
pp. 9-11. Bichler asserts that there is no mutuality of obligation because DEI is 
attempting to setoff debts owed by Bichler to ESG (DEI's parent company) against 
DEI's debts to Bichler under the Lease Agreement. Bichler's argument, however, 
entirely misstates the basis of DEI's claim of setoff against Bichler. 
1
 Bichler's reliance on out-of-state case law is equally misplaced. Bichler, 
failing to find any Utah case law to support his position, asks this Court to look to 
Arizona and Washington, arguing that the courts there have "found that a right of 
setoff is not a valid counterclaim or defense to an unlawful detainer action." See 
Appellee Brief, p. 7 (citing Colonial Tri-City Ltd. Partnership v. Ben Franklin 
Stores, Inc., 880 P.2d 648 (Ariz. App. 1993J; Motoda v. Donohoe, 459 P.2d 654 
(Wash. App. 1969)). Neither case, however, actually involves the assertion of a 
setoff against the payment of rent. Critically, both Arizona law and Washington 
law, unlike Utah law, expressly prohibit a court from considering any 
counterclaims and offsets in an unlawful detainer action. See Colonial Tri-City, 
880 P.2d at 653 (applying Arizona law: "a trial court hearing a section 33-361 
action governed under the forcible entry and detainer statute may not consider 
counterclaims, offsets, or cross claims..."); Motoda, 459 P.2d at 655 (applying 
Washington law: "Defendants have not been permitted to assert offsets and 
counterclaims in [an unlawful detainer action]."). Utah law contains no such 
prohibition and, contrary to Washington and Arizona courts, Utah courts have 
expressly allowed such defenses and counterclaims in unlawful detainer actions. 
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Mutuality of obligation exists when the debts are to and from the same 
entities and in the same capacity. See In re Davidovich, 901 F.2d 1533, 1537 (10th 
Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). See also 20 AM. JUR. 2D COUNTERCLAIM, 
RECOUPMENT AND SETOFF § 49 ("the setoff...and the action must be between the 
same parties and in the same capacity...."). The concept of capacity requires that 
the parties must each owe the other something individually, i.e. in his or her own 
name, and not as a trustee of a trust, or as a fiduciary or agent for some other party. 
See In re Nuclear Imaging Systems, Inc., 260 B.R. 724, 734-35 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
2000) (citing 5 Collier on Bankruptcy, % 553.03[3][c] (15th ed. rev. 1999)). See 
also First Security Bank of Utah v. Utah Turkey Growers, Inc., 610 P.2d 329, 333 
(Utah 1980) ("It is only where the claim is held against a defendant in his fiduciary 
capacity, and the right of setoff is asserted by him in an individual capacity (or vice 
versa), that mutuality is lacking."). 
DEI's claim of setoff here satisfies the mutuality of obligation 
requirement. Bichler in this unlawful detainer action seeks to recover money 
damages from DEI in its individual capacity under the Lease Agreement. DEI has 
claimed a right to setoff against its rent obligations to Bichler the damages caused 
by Bichler's breach of his Employment Agreement with DEI and his breach of 
fiduciary duty as an officer of DEI. (R. 34; R. 88; R. 110 - R. 112). In both 
instances, the debts owed are in the parties' individual capacities, and not as 
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representatives of any third party. Although ESG has claims against Bichler for 
his breach of the Purchase Agreement, DEI has not attempted in this action to 
setoff those debts against its rent payment obligations to Bichler under the Lease 
Agreement. 
C. DEFs Claim of Setoff Against its Rent Payment Obligations Are Not 
Precluded by the Lease Agreement, and in any Event, Properly Exist 
Apart from any Contractual Provision 
Bichler finally argues that DEI cannot assert a claim of setoff against 
its rent payment obligations because the "plain language" of Lease Agreement 
precludes DEI from asserting any such claim. Appellee's Brief, pp. 11-12. 
Essentially, Bichler asks this Court to ignore the only reference to setoff in the 
Lease Agreement, in favor of an irrelevant provision that makes no reference at all 
to setoff. Contrary to Bichler's position, the "plain language" of the Lease 
Agreement expressly allows, not precludes, DEI to assert a claim of setoff against 
its rent payment obligations. In any event, the terms of the Lease Agreement 
regarding setoff are superfluous, as DEI's right of setoff properly exists apart from, 
and even in the absence of, any contractual provision. 
Bichler, relying on the Lease Agreement's definition of "material 
default," contends that the Lease Agreement precludes DEI from asserting any 
claim of setoff against the rent payment obligations. Appellee's Brief, p. 11. This 
provision provides that a "material default" occurs upon "[DEI's] failure to pay 
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any rent...to be paid by [DEI] as provided in the Lease strictly within the time 
provided and in the amount as required by the terms of this Lease...." (R. 60). 
This provision only means that DEI shall pay Bichler all money due under the 
Lease Agreement. It does not prevent DEI from lawfully asserting any defense or 
setoff to its obligation to pay rent under the Lease Agreement. 
On the other hand, Paragraph 25 of the Lease Agreement, the only 
provision in the Agreement to reference the term setoff, requires DEI, upon the 
request of Bichler, to either certify that it has no claims of setoff to enforcement of 
the Lease Agreement or to confirm such claims in writing. (R. 15 - R. 16, If 25) 
("[DEI] shall...execute and deliver to [Bichler] a written declaration...certifying 
that there are no defenses or offset against the enforcement of this lease by 
[Bichler], or stating those claimed by [DEI].") Paragraph 25's specific 
authorization of setoff claims by DEI cannot be reconciled with Bichler's 
construction of the Lease Agreement. The "plain language" of Paragraph 25 
expressly authorizes DEI to assert a claim of setoff, or at a minimum, requires a 
finding by the Court that the Lease Agreement is ambiguous and extrinsic evidence 
must be considered to facilitate its interpretation, which the District Court failed to 
allow. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 11-12 (discussing Utah's rules of contract 
interpretation). 
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Bichler's position also fails because it erroneously assumes that a 
right of setoff can only exist if it is afforded by contract. Appellee's Brief, pp. 11-
12. However, as a matter of law, a defendant's right of setoff is equitable and 
properly exists apart from, and even in the absence of, any contractual provision. 
See Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-10 (discussing the legal basis for claims of setoff). 
Accordingly, DEI's claim of setoff is proper even if the Lease Agreement does not 
expressly afford DEI a right of setoff, which it does. 
[Remainder of Page Left Intentionally Blank] 
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III. Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth above, and those set forth in Appellant's 
Brief, DEI respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court's Order 
granting summary judgment in favor of Bichler, with directions that DEI be 
permitted to pursue its claim of setoff in this unlawful detainer action. 
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